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PRIVATIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION—REFLECTIONS ON 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
PETER W. SALSICH, JR.* 
Carol Rose’s concluding point that privatization, while important, is but 
one of a whole array of political reforms necessary for democracy to flourish,1 
is well taken.  Her caution that privatization by itself does not guarantee 
success in democratic endeavors is reflected in the current controversy over the 
use of eminent domain by local governments to foster economic development. 
The widespread inclusion of eminent domain in local government 
economic development toolboxes is due in large part to the privatization of the 
redevelopment process.  From the urban renewal projects of the 1940s and 
1950s to the tax increment finance (TIF) projects of today, the public–private 
partnership has been the favored vehicle for local redevelopment efforts.  Such 
partnerships usually consist of a city agency, such as an urban renewal 
authority or a public housing authority, one or more limited partnerships made 
up of private developer general partners and private investor limited partners, 
and in some cases not-for-profit community-based development organizations 
(CBDOs).2 
A critical component of these partnerships is the active participation by 
private developers and investors in a redevelopment process organized and 
planned by governmental agencies, usually an arm of local government.  For 
example, in Berman v. Parker,3 the case that triggered the modern controversy 
over the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes, a public 
agency, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency (Agency), was 
authorized by a federal statute to “acquire and assemble the real property in the 
 
* McDonnell Professor of Justice in American Society, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 693–
94 (2006). 
 2. For discussion of various aspects of the public–private partnership phenomenon in the 
housing and community development context, see Kirk McClure, The Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit As an Aid to Housing Finance: How Well Has It Worked?, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 91 
(2000); Susan J. Popkin et al., The HOPE VI Program: What About the Residents?, 15 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 385 (2004); Jane Ennis Sheehan, Mixed Finance: A Real Estate Lawyer’s “Field 
of Dreams,” 7 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 289 (1998); Sean Zielenbach, 
Catalyzing Community Development: HOPE VI and Neighborhood Revitalization, 13 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 40 (2003).  
 3. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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area,” by eminent domain if necessary, to implement redevelopment plans that 
had been approved by the District’s governing body.4  Among the 
congressional findings was the declaration that eliminating slums and blight 
could not be accomplished “by the ordinary operations of private enterprise 
alone without public participation.”5  Once the land was assembled, the 
Agency was authorized to lease or sell property not needed for streets and 
other public facilities to private entities who agreed to carry out the 
redevelopment plan.6  As noted by the Court, “Preference [was] to be given to 
private enterprise over public agencies in executing the redevelopment plan.”7 
While the urban renewal program that was approved by the Berman Court 
was widely condemned as destructive of low income, albeit stable, 
communities,8 and was eliminated as an active program by the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974,9 the privatization concept inherent in 
the public–private partnership approach to urban redevelopment continues to 
be emphasized in federal programs such as the Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) program,10 the Section 8 Certificate and Voucher 
programs,11 the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program12 and the 
HOPE VI program to convert distressed public housing developments into 
mixed-income communities,13 as well as state programs such as the sale of tax-
exempt municipal bonds to finance affordable housing developments,14 and tax 
increment financing (TIF), a state-authorized program enabling municipalities 
 
 4. Id. at 29–30 (citing relevant portions of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 
1945, D.C. CODE §§ 5-701–719 (1951)). 
 5. Id. at 28–29 (quoting section 2 of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945). 
 6. Id. at 30 (citing section 7 of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945). 
 7. Id. (citing section 7(g) of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945). 
 8. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 311–14 (Vintage 
Books 1992) (1961) (containing perhaps the most articulate condemnation by criticizing urban 
renewal and public housing programs as “inherently wasteful ways of rebuilding cities, [that] in 
comparison with their full costs make pathetic contributions to city values”). 
 9. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 116, 88 Stat. 
652 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000)); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450–1451 (sections omitted 
pursuant to § 5316). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5317 (2000). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000). 
 12. 26 I.R.C. § 42 (2002). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1437v (2000). 
 14. For example, the Missouri Housing Development Commission, authorized by Chapter 
215 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, reported in 2004 that during its thirty-five year life it had 
invested almost $4 billion raised by the sale of municipal bonds in affordable rental and for-sale 
housing.  MO. HOUS. DEV. COMM’N, 2004 ANN. REP., available at http://www.mhdc.com/about/ 
financials/FY2004_MHDC_Annual_Report.pdf; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 215.020 (2000).  The 
report notes that most of the Commission’s programs involve “public-private partnership[s].”  
MO. HOUS. DEV. COMM’N, 2004 ANN. REP. 2. 
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to capture property and sales tax receipts generated by new development to 
fund public improvements within the development area.15 
These programs often are used in concert, and eminent domain has been 
utilized in a number of situations, particularly with tax increment financing, in 
which a public–private partnership is using some or all of the above-referenced 
programs.  For example, in New London, Connecticut, a private nonprofit 
organization, the New London Development Corporation (NLDC) prepared an 
economic development plan to revitalize a ninety-acre area of the city.16  
Preparation of the plan was funded in part by a $5 million state bond issue, and 
the plan was approved by city and state officials.17  The plan called for a 
mixed-use development of public and private facilities and had goals of 
creating “in excess of 1,000 jobs . . . and revitaliz[ing] an economically 
distressed city.”18  Following approval of the plan, the New London city 
council named the NLDC its development agent to implement the plan and 
authorized the NLDC to acquire property, either by purchase or by eminent 
domain in the name of the city, as authorized by Connecticut law.19 
A half-century after Berman, the Supreme Court touched off a firestorm20 
with its decision in Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut,21 that economic 
development could be a “public use” supporting the acquisition of private 
property by municipalities through the exercise of eminent domain on behalf of 
a public–private partnership.22  In affirming a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut,23 the Court noted that the use of eminent domain to acquire 
private property in furtherance of an economic development plan is authorized 
 
 15. For discussion and constitutional approval of tax increment financing, see Meierhenry v. 
City of Huron, 354 N.W.2d 171 (S.D. 1984); see also Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The 
Effect of Tax Increment Financing on Land Use, in THE PROPERTY TAX, LAND USE AND LAND 
USE REGULATION 37 (Dick Netzer ed., 2003) (casting doubt on the effectiveness of TIF as a 
stimulant of new economic growth); Fred Allen Forgey, Tax Increment Financing: Equity, 
Effectiveness, and Efficiency, 60 ICMA MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 25, 32 (1993) (providing an 
example of how the tax increment is calculated). 
 16. The description of the New London redevelopment plan is drawn from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 2658 (quoting from the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s opinion in the case, 843 
A.2d 500, 507 (2004)). 
 19. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659–60; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8–193 (West 2001). 
 20. See, e.g., The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private 
Property: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) [hereinafter 
Hearing] (testimony of Thomas A. Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia 
Law School) (asserting that Kelo is “unique in modern annals of law in terms of the negative 
response it has evoked”). 
 21. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 2665–67. 
 23. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004). 
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by Connecticut’s municipal development statute.24  The Court reiterated its 
previous conclusions in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff25 and Berman v. 
Parker26 that the public use test was broader than the “use by the public” test 
popular in the mid-19th century and rejected by the Supreme Court 100 years 
ago in an opinion by Justice Holmes as “inadequate[] . . . as a universal test.”27  
The Court emphasized that “[f]or more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in 
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs 
justify the use of the takings power.”28 
In accepting the city’s argument that the use of eminent domain was 
justified even though the property it sought to acquire was not blighted, Justice 
Stevens, writing for the 5–4 majority, rejected the petitioners’ call for a “new 
bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use,” 
asserting that “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long 
accepted function of government.”29  But in sustaining the city’s use of 
eminent domain to foster its economic development plan, Justice Stevens 
“emphasize[d] that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”30 
 
 24. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-186, 8-193 (West 2005).  Chapter 132 begins with a 
statement of policy that 
the acquisition and improvement of unified land and water areas [in accordance with 
local, regional and state planning objectives] . . . often cannot be accomplished through 
the ordinary operations of private enterprise at competitive rates of progress and 
economics of cost; . . . [and] permitting and assisting municipalities to acquire and 
improve unified land and water areas . . . for industrial and business purposes . . . within a 
project area in accordance with such planning objectives are public uses and 
purposes . . . . 
Id. at § 8-186; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659–60.  In § 8-193, the legislature specifically 
authorizes local development agencies, “with the approval of the legislative body, and in the 
name of the municipality, [to] acquire by eminent domain real property located within the project 
area . . . .”  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-193. 
 25. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 26. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 27. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (quoting Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 
U.S. 527, 531 (1906)).  The Court also quoted at length from an 1876 Nevada Supreme Court 
opinion about the “overly restrictive” nature of the “use by the public” test in evaluating takings 
to support the private mining industry to which “[t]he present prosperity of the state is entirely 
due.”  Id. at 2662 n.8 (quoting Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 409–
10 (1876)). 
 28. Id. at 2664. 
 29. Id. at 2665. 
 30. Id. at 2668.  The Court subsequently cited County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 
765 (2004), which overruled Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 
(Mich. 1981), and concluded that Michigan’s constitution prohibits the use of eminent domain for 
economic development.  The Court also cited CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33030–33037 
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As noted above, a groundswell of criticism has erupted across the country 
since the Court handed down its decision in Kelo.31  I recently had a first-hand 
exposure to the intense emotions that have been unleashed by Kelo.  As a 
member of a panel invited to discuss the implications of Kelo at a public forum 
sponsored by a citizen’s advocacy group in St. Louis, I attempted to present a 
neutral, academically oriented analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling with 
particular emphasis on the Court’s point that the state is the ultimate decision-
maker and can choose to place limits on the use of eminent domain by 
municipalities and other government entities. 
Many in the audience were home owners and business owners who either 
had lost their property to eminent domain or the threat of eminent domain, or 
lived in areas targeted by municipalities and developers for redevelopment.  
One particularly controversial development in the St. Louis suburb of Sunset 
Hills had galvanized a number of the people in attendance.  A private 
developer had been awarded development rights to a working class residential 
area the city wants to have redeveloped primarily as a retail shopping center in 
order to generate more sales tax for the city’s coffers.  The city delegated the 
power of eminent domain to the developer under a state statute authorizing the 
use of eminent domain for redevelopment of “blighted,” “conservation,” or 
“economic development” areas.32  With the power of eminent domain in 
reserve, the developer persuaded a number of home and business owners to 
sign contracts to sell their property to the developer.  Subsequently, the 
developer disclosed that it had been unable to secure permanent financing for 
its proposed shopping center and office complex and that it did not have the 
 
(West 1997), which states that land may be taken for economic development purposes only if the 
area is blighted. 
 31. As this Note was being written, legislation was pending in both houses of Congress and 
over half the states to sharply curtail the use of eminent domain for urban revitalization and 
economic development.  See, e.g., Jim Abrams, House Moves to Counter Supreme Court’s ‘Kelo’ 
Decision, Nov. 4, 2005, available at  http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1131012310814&rss 
=newswire; Tresa Baldas, States Ride Post-“Kelo” Wave of Legislation, THE NAT’L L.J., Aug. 1, 
2005, at 1. 
 32. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 99.800, 99.820 (2000 & Supp. 2004).  A blighted area is defined as 
an area that for a number of listed reasons “retards the provision or housing accommodations or 
constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare in its present condition or use.”  § 99.805(1).  A conservation area is an area in which 
more than half of the structures exceed thirty-five years in age.  While not yet a blighted area, it 
may become one because of the presence of a number of enumerated factors such as dilapidation, 
obsolescence, etc.  § 99.805(3).  An economic development area is an area that does not meet the 
qualifications of a blighted or conservation area, but in which the municipality concludes that 
redevelopment would discourage businesses from leaving the state, or create jobs in the 
municipality or “result in preservation or enhancement” of the municipality’s tax base.  § 
99.805(5).  Sunset Hills designated the area in question as blighted.  Martin Van Der Werf, If at 
First You Can’t Blight Sunset Manor, Try, and Try Again, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 
2005, at C1. 
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funds to complete the purchases of the residents’ property.  This left many of 
the residents with commitments to buy other property but unable to generate 
funds to complete their transactions because the funds for the new purchases 
were to come from the sale of their properties to the developer33—a situation 
that one lawyer involved in the dispute described as “an American tragedy.”34 
In the discussion session following the panel presentations, several persons 
who identified themselves as residents of the Sunset Hills neighborhood or 
other neighborhoods in the St. Louis area undergoing similar redevelopment35 
made passionate pleas for understanding of their hardships.  Academic legal 
arguments about precedent, original intent, judicial deference and the like had 
little relevance to them.  A neighborhood businessman and resident captured 
the mood of many in the audience when he declared: “It is very hard to 
appreciate the fear, concern and downright terror that people experience when 
they are threatened with the loss of their home or business.  We have failed to 
identify the intangible human element in eminent domain.”36 
While much of the anger was directed at real estate developers, local 
public officials who supported current redevelopment efforts and who made 
the decisions to authorize the use of eminent domain in redevelopment 
projects, were also heavily criticized.  A local planner who had the courage to 
present the cities’ arguments for use of eminent domain to support economic 
development was greeted with disdain.37 
The irony of the situation, and what makes it relevant to Professor Rose’s 
presentation, is that the main disputants, the developers and the land owners, 
both are beneficiaries of the privatization concept—developers as beneficiaries 
of local government’s willingness to use eminent domain to assist private 
developers in the acquisition of property deemed essential or desirable for 
implementation of an economic development plan in order to induce those 
private actors to join a public–private partnership (a deregulation or, perhaps 
more accurately, a divestment form of privatization),38 and land owners as 
beneficiaries of the recognition (titling) form of privatization.39 
 
 33. Phil Sutin & Eric Heisler, No Novus Partner Means No Meeting, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 28, 2005, at B1. 
 34. Telephone Conversation with Gerard T. Carmody, Esq., Principal, Carmody MacDonald, 
in St. Louis, Mo. (Sept. 22, 2005). 
 35. Things got so hot in the “Dogtown” neighborhood of St. Louis that the sitting alderman 
was voted out of office in a special election on Sept. 20, 2005.  Jake Wagman, Alderman is 
Recalled in Special Election; Eminent Domain Cited, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 21, 2005, 
at B4. 
 36. James Roos, Remarks at public forum in St. Louis, Missouri, sponsored by Adequate 
Housing for Missourians (AHM) (Sept. 27, 2005). 
 37. Nancy Ullman, Urban Planner, Remarks at same AHM meeting (Sept. 27, 2005). 
 38. Rose, supra note 1, at 696–97. 
 39. Id. at 694–95. 
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The controversy over eminent domain, particularly as it is being played out 
in St. Louis, illustrates dramatically Professor Rose’s main point that 
privatization is but one of a number of concerns that must be addressed in 
advancing a democratic agenda.  Much of the criticism of local and state 
officials has focused on a perceived lack of accountability, competency, and 
most importantly, transparency.  People who spoke at the public meeting at the 
Salvation Army headquarters repeatedly expressed distrust of local and state 
elected and appointed officials because of their perception that those officials 
did not respect the opinions of the affected land owners nor did those officials 
empathize with their sufferings as a result of the redevelopment process as it is 
currently prosecuted. 
Unfortunately, public officials feed this sense of distrust and ostracism 
with their actions. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch carried a story recently 
concerning the decision by the City of Sunset Hills to declare the Sunset 
Manor subdivision, a residential neighborhood of small single-family homes 
built in the period after World War II, blighted.40  According to the story, the 
city hired a consulting firm to examine the neighborhood for evidence of 
blight.41  The consulting firm concluded that, while homes were small and 
“getting on” in years, the neighborhood did not meet the criteria of blight in the 
city’s TIF ordinance.42  Whereupon another firm was hired and the second firm 
found sufficient evidence of blight, in part because some houses had bedrooms 
in basements, porch stairs had settled and some windows were too small to 
permit people to climb out in the event of an emergency.43 
The privatized urban redevelopment process popular in many cities today 
often depends on the power of eminent domain, not necessarily its use, but 
rather the threat of its use.  As noted earlier,44 bad experiences in the 1950s and 
1960s with urban renewal and public housing programs,45 dramatized by critics 
such as Jane Jacobs,46 led governments at all levels to privatize as much as 
possible the urban redevelopment process.  Programs in the 1960s such as the 
federal 221(d), 235, and 236 programs47 and the state housing bond programs 
seeded the process of transformation.  Passage of the 1974 Housing and 
 
 40. Van Der Werf, supra note 32, at C1. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (referring to urban renewal); Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 653 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1437 (2000)) (referring to public housing). 
 46. JACOBS, supra note 8, at 313. 
 47. 12 U.S.C. § 1715l (2000) (Section 221(d) mortgage insurance for moderate income 
rental development); Id. at § 1715z (2000) (Section 235 homeownership interest subsidy); id. at § 
1715z-1 (2000) (Section 236 interest subsidy for rental unit development). 
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Community Development Act48 containing the Section 849 and CDBG50 
programs cemented the redevelopment process in a private sector mode.  The 
Section 8 and CDBG programs remain key elements of national, state, and 
local housing and urban development policy,51 and when used in conjunction 
with the TIF program described earlier,52 may be included in the financing of 
developments assisted by the use, or threat, of eminent domain. 
Calls to prohibit the use of eminent domain in aid of economic 
development projects in the wake of Kelo have struck a public nerve, primarily 
because such use strikes many people as unconstitutional government 
collaboration in the forced transfer of private property from one private person 
to another private person.53  But Kelo served a useful purpose—it reminded us 
that the appropriate decision-maker on the extent of the use of eminent domain 
by local governments is the state legislature.54  Rather than an absolute 
prohibition of eminent domain in the economic development context,55 the 
legislature can and should place prudent limits on its use. 
Professor Rose offers a blueprint of those prudent limits in her discussion 
of some of the values of privatization.56  To listen to private property owners 
affected by local use of eminent domain in redevelopment efforts, one gets the 
sense that the “civilizing ‘give-and-take’” of commerce that she equates with 
privatization57 often is missing from these encounters.  Would there be less 
controversy and less sense of government favoring the interests of the wealthy 
and powerful at the expense of the less well-to-do if state law required local 
governments to offer residents of a potential redevelopment area seats at the 
planning table and a first opportunity to prepare a plan, similar to the request 
 
 48. Pub. L. No. 93-383, §101, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 5301–5321 (2000)). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. 
 50. Id. §§ 5301–5317. 
 51. For example, a key aspect of the recovery process for the New Orleans and other areas of 
the Gulf regions devastated by Hurricane Katrina is a special allocation of Section 8 vouchers to 
house low income evacuees as well as low income residents who have returned to their home 
areas.  Eric Lipton, Hurricane Evacuees Face Eviction Threats at Both Their Old Homes and 
New, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1. 
 52. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
 53. This sense is captured dramatically by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s stinging dissent 
in Kelo: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.  Nothing is to prevent the State 
from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with 
a factory.”  Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2676 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2664 (majority opinion) (stating that “[f]or more than a century, our public use 
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording 
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power”). 
 55. Without eminent domain, how does a city respond to the rent-seeking holdout who is 
attempting to inflate the price of his or her land well beyond its market value? 
 56. Rose, supra note 1, at 715–19. 
 57. Id. at 718. 
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for proposals given to developers, before seeking proposals from professional 
developers?58 
Would there be fewer holdouts/opponents and/or more attention paid to 
alternatives to eminent domain if state law required local governments 
contemplating the use of eminent domain in economic development activities 
to offer property owners a premium above fair market value that represents the 
years in which they have resided at the location the city or its developer seeks 
to acquire?59 
Economic development is, and probably should remain, primarily a private 
enterprise process.  But the private market is not perfect and governments 
should, and do, intervene when market imperfections cause harm to people.  
The trick is to know when and how to intervene in order to maximize the 
benefits while minimizing the costs of such intervention.  State legislators and 
local government officials would do well to heed Professor Rose’s caution 
about the limits of privatization and the importance of accountability, 
competency, and transparency in their economic development endeavors. 
 
 58. Marvin Nodiff, a St. Louis attorney with extensive experience representing homeowners 
and developers of common-interest communities, has made this suggestion to a state legislator.  
Letter from Marvin J. Nodiff to Mo. Rep. Rachel Storch (Sept. 7, 2005) (copy on file with 
author). 
 59. Professor Thomas A. Merrill made this suggestion in his testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  Hearing, supra note 20. 
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